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The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction 
between International Institutions1
T H O M A S  G E H R IN G  and S E B A S T IA N  O B E R T H U R  
Otto-Friedrich- University, Bamberg, Germany an d  Institute fo r  Free 
University o f  Brussels, Belgium
This article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analy­
sis o f  the interaction between international institutions as a first step 
towards building a theory o f  international interaction. I t  examines how 
international institutions may exert causal influence on each other’s 
development and effectiveness and suggests that four general causal 
mechanisms can elucidate the distinct routes through which influence 
travels from one institution to another. Institutional interaction can 
thus rely on transfer o f  knowledge, commitments established under an 
institution, behavioural effects o f an institution, and functional linkage 
ot the ultimate governance targets o f  the institutions involved. The 
article also puts forward hypotheses about the likely effects o f  specific 
types o f institutional interaction for governance within the interna­
tional system. The causal mechanisms and types of interaction are 
mutually exclusive models that help analyse real-world interaction situ­
ations. They may also serve as a basis for the systematic analysis o f more 
complex interaction situations.
K e y  W o r d s  ♦  effectiv eness o f  in ternation al in stitu tion s ♦ 
en viron m en tal gov ern ance ♦  global govern ance ♦ institu tional 
com plexes ♦ institutional interplay ♦ international governance ♦ 
regim e collision ♦  regim e conflict
Introduction
The ability o f  international institutions to influence each other’s develop 
ment and effectiveness ( ‘institutional interaction’ ) is increasingly recognized. 
Whereas international institutions have traditionally been analysed in isolation 
from each other (Haas et al., 1993; Victor et al., 1998, Miles et al., 2002), 
scholars have drawn attention to the growing ‘regime density’ (Young,
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1996) and identified the risk o f ‘treaty congestion’ (Brown Weiss, 1993: 
679). Contributions on institutional interaction have mostly examined spe­
cific situations such as the problematic relationship between the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and several multilateral environmental agreements 
with trade restrictions (Tarasofsky, 1997; Brack, 2 0 0 2 ), overlapping jurisdic­
tions o f human rights institutions and related courts (Tistounet, 2000), or 
the interaction between the International Labour Organization (ILO ) and 
the W TO (Compa and Diamond, 1996; Moorman, 2001).
Conceptual knowledge about the causal mechanisms through which influ­
ence travels from one institution to another has, however, remained sharply 
limited (see the overview in Stokke, 2001a: 1 -8 ; Gehring and Oberthiir 
2009). Existing approaches focus on an interaction situation or a ‘regime 
complex’ (Raustiala and Victor, 2004) without systematically analysing the 
causal relationship between the institutions involved, or they mainly attempt 
to systematize and categorize phenomena o f institutional interaction (e.g. 
Young, 2002; Stokke, 2000 , 2001b ; Rosendal, 2 0 0 1 ; Young et al., 2008). 
Other contributions address particular aspects o f  interaction, such as the 
nesting o f institutions within each other (Aggarwal, 1998).
This article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis 
o f the interaction of international institutions as a first step towards building 
a theory of institutional interaction. It examines how international institu­
tions may exert causal influence on each other’s development and effectiveness. 
To this end, it introduces a conceptual framework that focuses on the explo­
ration o f causal mechanisms o f institutional interaction. This framework is 
based upon established approaches assessing regime effectiveness and the 
causal analysis o f regime consequences (Bernauer, 1995; Underdal and 
Young, 2004). We develop four causal mechanisms that elucidate the distinct 
routes through which influence can travel from one institution to another 
and reveal the role o f various actors in this process. These causal mechanisms 
rely on transfer o f knowledge, commitments established under an institution, 
ehavioural effects o f an institution, and functional interdependence of 
the ulnmate targets of governance o f the institutions involved. In accordance with 
t ie  bulk o f literature on the effectiveness o f international governance insti­
tutions, we focus exclusively on negotiated institutions that may be defined 
as persistent and connected sets o f rules and practices that prescribe behav- 
îoura roes, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane, 1989: 3).
Relevant institutions include both international regimes and in te rn a tio n a l 
organizations.
1 he identified causal mechanisms o f interaction help analyse re a l-w o rld  
cases of institutional interaction and provide the foundation for the 
evelopment o f a theory o f  institutional interaction. Each o f  them reflects 
a istinct rationale o f institutional interaction. Similar to  the familiar
126
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game-theoretic models that help understand cooperation problems (Snidal, 
1985; Martin, 1993), they abstract from the complexity o f real-world cases 
of institutional interaction and draw attention to the underlying rationales of 
interaction. More specific ideal types o f institutional interaction, which we 
develop on the basis o f the causal mechanisms, help assess systematically the 
conditions that must be fulfilled for institutional interaction to occur and 
the likely effects o f  interaction for governance within the international 
system. However, we do not make any claims as to which institutions are 
particularly prone to institutional interaction.
Although we illustrate our argument primarily with cases from inter 
national environmental governance, the causal mechanisms and ideal types 
are applicable to international institutions at large. The models have been 
developed against the backdrop o f  the largest comparative assessment so far 
of more than 150 cases o f institutional interaction from the realm o f inter­
national and EU  environmental institutions (Oberthiir and Gehring, 
2006a). However, their distinct rationales are independent from any specific 
policy area. They can be applied to interaction situations located within other 
policy fields and cutting across policy fields.
Cause—Effect Relationship and Causal Mechanisms of 
Institutional Interaction
Establishing a  Cause—Effect Relationship between Two Institutions
Institutional interaction will exist if one institution (the source institution) 
affects the development or performance o f another institution (the target 
institution). Otherwise, we would merely observe the parallel, but causally 
unrelated, development o f two or more institutions. Causation implies that 
an effect observed within the target institution or its issue-area is attributable 
to another institution so that we would not expect the effect to occur in the 
absence o f the source institution (King et al., 1994: 75 -8 5 ). To establish 
an incident o f institutional interaction, we must identify (1) the source insti­
tution (or its particular component or decision) from which influence origin 
ates as the independent variable; (2) the target institution (or the particular 
component) that is subject to influence originating from the source institu­
tion as the dependent variable; and (3) a cause-effect relationship between 
the source institution and the target institution that accounts for the iden­
tified effect. There is no institutional interaction without an effect within the 
target institution or the issue-area governed by it, be it observable or antici­
pated (Gehring and Oberthiir, 2004).
I f  an in teraction  situation includes several cases o f  interaction with 
distinct cau se-effect relationships, the cases must be separately analysed.
127
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Decomposition o f complex interaction situations will be especially relevant in 
three types o f situations. First, two institutions may be involved in numerous 
cases of interaction with different properties at the same time. For example, the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer indirectly pro­
motes the use o f certain greenhouse gases (hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs) regu­
lated under the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Furthermore, its non-compliance procedure provided a precedent for 
the elaboration of a similar component within the climate change regime 
(Oberthür, 2001 ). Second, several regimes may interact with each other in vari­
ous forms. For example, the ‘regime complex’ o f  plant genetic resources 
involves the International Convention for the Protection o f New Varieties of 
Plants, two agreements under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), the W TO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) (Raustiala and Victor, 2004; Jungcurt, 2008). Third, two or more 
institutions may ‘co-evolve’ over time so that neither would exist in its current 
state in the absence o f the other. I f  influence runs back and forth between 
the institutions, analytical decomposition o f the co-evolution process into 
sequential cases helps examine clear cause-effect relationships (Archer, 1985; 
Carlsnaes, 1992). For example, the global Basel Convention on the 
1 ransboundary Movement o f Hazardous Wastes triggered the establishment of 
several regional regimes with tighter regulatory approaches. Subsequently, the 
latter influenced the development o f the Basel Convention (Clapp, 1994).
The consequences o f a case o f institutional interaction may be beneficial, 
adverse, or neutral for the target institution. The main effects o f  institutional 
interaction occur in the target institution and can be assessed against this 
institution’s prime objective.2 I f  the effects o f  institutional interaction sup­
port the objectives o f the target institution, they will create synergy between 
the two institutions involved. I f  they contradict the target institution’s object­
ive, they will result in disruption. The effects o f  an interaction will be inde­
terminate or neutral if they do not clearly hamper or reinforce the pursuit of 
the target institution’s objective.
Tfc Starch for C m al Mecbamm, hM m a„
another w e ^ h e n r ^ n '11fluence can be transferred from  one institution to 
interaction From rh ^  ^ ^e^eloP fou r causal m echanism s o f  institutional
" S l Z t a i v  deriv' m o re ^
causal mechanism  " "  » f  cases driven by the same
b « t r l m ' l a,™ l ? enS i h ' b! a<*  o f t h e  ca u se -e ffe ct relationshtp
ons involved (E lster, 1989 : 3- 10 ; K ing et 1994 :
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85-7) and provides an explanadon for the causal effect observed. It may 
be conceived o f as a set o f statements that are logically connected and provide 
a plausible account o f how a given cause creates an observed effect (Schelling, 
1998). In the absence o f both firmly established theories o f institutional 
interaction and large-« studies allowing for statistical analysis, causal mecha­
nisms help distinguish between genuine causality and ‘spurious correlation’. 
They make explicit the underlying causal pathway that links the source insti­
tution to the target institution (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998: 7 -12).
Causal mechanisms provide a micro-foundation for the analysis o f institu­
tional interaction and reveal how actors matter in the process (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 135-45). In cases o f institutional interaction, both the inde­
pendent and the dependent variables, i.e. the source institution and the target 
institution, are located at the macro-level. However, an international institution 
will rarely influence another institution directly without intermediate adaptation 
of preferences or behaviour by relevant actors. Hence, a concept of institutional 
interaction requires, like any other theory in the social sciences, a reliable 
micro-macro link (Buzan et al., 1993: 104; Alexander and Giesen, 1987).3 
A causal mechanism links the micro-level o f actors with the macro-level o f insti­
tutions. It elucidates how actors are involved in transferring influence from one 
institution to the other. Depending on the precise causal mechanism at work, 
several types o f  actors, including states, non-governmental organizations, 
industry, or the secretariats o f international institutions, may play an important 
role in institutional interaction (see also Selin and VanDeveer, 2003).
A typical causal mechanism explaining how one institution exerts influ­
ence on another institution involves three distinct steps, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. Instead o f  analysing relationships between phenomena exclu­
sively on the macro-level, it seeks to establish how macro-level events or 
conditions affect the individual (step 1), how the individual assimilates the 
impact o f  these  macro-level events (step 2 ), and how several individuals, 
through their actions and interactions, generate macro-level outcomes 
(step 3) (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998: 2 1 -2 ; Coleman, 1990. 1 -23 ). 
A ccordingly, a situational m echanism  reveals how the source institution 
affects the preferences or behaviour o f  relevant actors within its own 
domain. An action-formation mechanism elucidates how this effect leads 
to a change o f  preferences or o f individual behaviour of actors relevant to 
the target institution. In this step, influence is transferred from the domain 
of the source institution to the domain o f the target institution. Finally, 
a transformational mechanism explains how the adaptation o f the individual 
preferences or behaviour o f  relevant actors leads to a change o f the target 
institution (for example in the form o f adapted rules) or o f  its effectiveness 
within its issue-area (for example through an increased rate o f  non- 
compliance). A causal relationship between the source institution and the
129
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Figure 1
Components o f a Typical Causal Mechanism o f  Institutional Interaction
Source institution | Target institution
Macro-level: •  rules, norms, decisions ! •  rules, norms, decisions
institutions •  knowledge •  performance/effectiveness
Micro-level: .  Change of perception I .  change of preference
actors » change of preference | .  change of behaviour
•  change of behavior |
I
Source: Adapted from  Hedstriim and Swedber¿ (1998: 22).
target institution presupposes that all three component mechanisms are 
activated.
I he empirical causal relationship between a given source institution and a 
possible target institution has to be carefully analysed according to the well- 
established methods o f causal inference in the social sciences (George and 
Bennett, 2005). I hese methods include counterfactual scenarios and the 
exclusion o f rival explanations. The construction o f counterfactual scenarios 
addresses the hypothetical question o f how the target institution and the 
issue-area governed by it would have developed in the absence o f the source 
institution (Fearon, 1991). The exclusion o f  alternative explanations 
(Bernauer, 1995) explores whether factors other than the source institution 
might convincingly explain the effects observed within the target institution 
or its issue-area. These methods are widely employed in the literature on the 
effectiveness o f international regimes (Underdal, 2004).
I heoretically derived causal mechanisms o f institutional interaction help 
identify the targets o f a causal influence, the precise causal pathways and their 
intermediate stages as well as the involved actors. Much like the well-known 
game theoretic models ot socially problematic situations, such as the 
1 risoner s Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes, they constitute models that 
cannot be empirically right or wrong (Snidal, 1985). However, they can elu­
cidate the core aspects o f the underlying cause-effect relationship, if they fit 
a given case o f institutional interaction.
To avoid overdetermination o f causal relationships, which is a typical prob­
lem o f causal mechanisms analysis (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998: 10), the
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theoretically derived causal mechanisms developed in this article are mutu­
ally exclusive. In this way, we ensure that the same pathway is not part o f  dif­
ferent models. I f  a full set o f  general causal mechanisms capable of driving 
institutional interaction is av ailable, the empirical analysis o f a particular case 
may focus on choosing the model which best reflects the properties o f the 
case, and on establishing whether all o f its component sub-mechanisms are 
actually at work.
Institutional interaction can occur on all three levels o f effectiveness of 
governance institutions. To be effective, a governance institution must pro­
duce an appropriate output in the form o f collective knowledge or norms 
prescribing, proscribing or permitting behaviour. The output may generate 
behavioural change o f  relevant actors, the outcome. Finally, changes o f behav­
iour might have an im pact on the ultimate governance target. This effec­
tiveness cascade is well established in the literature on international regimes 
(Underdal, 2004 : 34). It is illustrated in Figure 2 on the left side for the 
source institution and on the right side for the target institution (thin verti­
cal arrows). In cases o f institutional interaction, the output of the source
Figure 2
Causal Mechanisms and Levels o f Effectiveness
S ource  institution T arg et institution
C ognitive Interaction 
------- ^O utput ------------- k . Output
— ---------------------w
Interaction through Com m itm ent
Behavioural Interaction
O utcom eO u tco m e -  ------
’
Im pact-level Interaction ^
Im pact —  — ► Im pact
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institution eventually exerts influence on the ultimate target o f governance 
(impact) o f the target institution.
As illustrated in Figure 2, we identify four distinct theoretical causal mech­
anisms, which involve different targets o f influence, actors and/or compon­
ent sub-mechanisms. I f  causal influence can travel through different 
pathways from one institution to another, we need a set o f  different theor­
etically derived causal mechanisms. The causal mechanisms differ as to how 
far the effectiveness cascade o f the source institution is passed down before 
influence is transferred to the target side (bold arrows). Two causal mech­
anisms exert influence on the normative development o f  the target institution 
and are located at the output level. Two other causal mechanisms affect the 
performance o f the target institution within its own issue-area directly with­
out prior adjustment o f its norms and rules. They are located at the outcome 
level and at the impact level.
The causal mechanisms, as well as more specific ideal types o f  institutional 
interaction that reflect distinct characteristics o f cases driven by the same 
causal mechanism, allow us to make the first steps towards developing a 
theory o f institutional interaction. To this end, we examine three particularly 
important aspects o f institutional interaction reflected in the causal models. 
First, the models elucidate the different causal pathways through which 
one international institution can influence another international institution. 
Second, we explore the necessary conditions that must be fulfilled for inter­
action o f a particular type to occur. Third, we derive hypotheses as to the 
likely quality o f interaction effects for the target institution. However, at the 
present state o f knowledge about institutional interaction, we cannot put 
forward meaningful hypotheses as to the sufficient conditions under which 
institutional interaction is expected to occur.
The Causal Mechanism of Cognitive Interaction
Introducing the causal m echanism  o f  C ognitive In teractio n , we first discuss 
the rationale o f  this causal m echanism . Subsequently, we present tw o ideal 
types o f  C ognitive In teraction , nam ely learning from  a policy m odel and a 
request for assistance.
R ationale
Cognitive Interaction  is based on  the pow er o f  know ledge and ideas. It  may 
e conceived o f  as a particular form  o f  inter-institu tional learn ing (similarly
î o o î f ’ 501a' 10)' Information’ knowledge or ideas (Haas, 1992; Yee, 
1W 6) produced within one institution may modify the perception ofdecision- 
ma ers operating within another institution and thus significantly affect the
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decision-making process o f this institution. For example, the members o f an 
institution may discover, and decide to adopt, an institutional innovation 
introduced within another institution, such as a non-compliance procedure 
or a particular arrangement for providing assistance to developing countries.
Cognitive Interaction evolves in the following steps. First, the source insti 
tution needs to generate some new information such as a report revealing 
new scientific or technological insights or an institutional arrangement solv­
ing a particular regulatory problem. Second, some actor (e.g. a member state 
or a non-governmental organization) has to feed the information into the 
decision-making process o f  the target institution. Third, this information 
must change the order o f preferences o f actors relevant to the target institu­
tion. Fourth, this modification o f actors’ preferences has to influence the col 
lective negotiation process and the output o f the target institution. Cognitive 
Interaction is the least intrusive o f all causal mechanisms because learning 
cannot be imposed. Consequently, the source institution does not exert any 
pressure on the decision-makers o f the target institution. I f  relevant actors 
adapt their preferences, the effects will be felt even by those members of the 
target institution that have not been convinced.
Cognitive Interaction can only be expected to occur if the interests 
pursued by relevant actors o f the target institution are, unlike the frequent 
assumption o f rational choice co-operation theory, not fully determined (see 
Martin, 1993; Hasenclever et al., 1997). Rational actors can be expected to 
learn voluntarily only if their rationality is ‘bounded’, because their informa­
tion processing capacity is limited (Keohane, 1984: 100 -15 ; Haas, 2001 ), or 
if relevant information is not entirely available. Under these circumstances, 
actors will be prepared to adapt their preferences to new information 
(Checkel, 1998; Risse, 2000) that may originate from other institutions.
Cognitive Interaction occurs in two forms, depending on whether the 
learning process within the target institution is triggered unintentionally or 
intentionally by the source institution. The two types differ significantly in 
respect o f both the preconditions for their occurrence and the expected qual 
ity of interaction effects.
Unintentionally Triggered Cognitive Interaction: Policy Model
tf Cognitive Interaction is unintentionally triggered, members o f the target 
institution voluntarily use som e aspect o f the source institution as a policy 
model. For example, the compliance system under the Montreal Protocol for 
the protection o f  the ozone layer influenced the negotiations on the comph^ 
ance system under the Kyoto Protocol on climate c h a n g e  because it provided 
a model o f  how to supervise implementation and deal with cases o f possible 
non-compliance (Oberthür and O tt, 1999: 2 1 5 -2 2 ). The members o f the
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Montreal Protocol did not establish the model in order to influence the 
Kyoto Protocol. They also did not have the ability to impose their model on 
the target. Instead, the Montreal Protocol presented an institutional arrange­
ment which the members o f the Kyoto Protocol conceived o f as a useful 
source o f inspiration. Frequently, a model will be adapted so as to fit the par­
ticular needs o f the target institution (‘complex learning’; see Haas, 1990). 
Thus, the negotiators o f the Kyoto Protocol adapted and strengthened the 
model o f the compliance system o f the Montreal Protocol according to their 
particular needs (Werksman, 2005).
The policy-model type o f Cognitive Interaction can occur between any two 
institutions, whether or not their memberships or issue-areas overlap. Any 
institutional arrangement, decision, or scientific or technological information 
from any other institution might serve as a policy model. Institutions share a 
number of functional challenges such as monitoring, verification, enforcement 
and decision-making as well as the development o f governance instruments. 
I herefore, it is difficult to foresee which kind o f  information or decision ori­
ginating from which institution might prompt interaction o f this kind. Also, 
numerous types of actors may pick up the information or idea and feed it into 
the decision-making process o f another institution, including a member state, 
a non-governmental organization, the secretariat o f  the target institution, or 
relevant individuals. These actors do not even have to participate in the source 
institution, because they can obtain information and ideas by surveying the 
field, reading reports, or examining institutional arrangements.
Learning from a policy model can generally be expected to strengthen the 
effectiveness o f the target institution, while the source institution will largely 
remain unaffected. It requires that the members o f  the target institution col­
lectively consider the policy model to be useful. Normally, actors will refrain 
from adopting precedents or solutions that promise to undermine their com­
monly desired policies. In rare cases, however, actors may also learn how to 
deliberately hamper effectiveness. Thus, negotiators o f  the Kyoto Protocol 
ailed to agree on an institutional arrangement for feeding scientific and 
technical knowledge into policy-making that had proven to be effective 
under the Montreal Protocol, because parties opposing advances in inter­
national climate policy had learnt their lesson (Oberthür, 2001 : 360-1)- 
Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that actors learn ‘wrong’ lessons that are 
ys inctional for the target institution, for example because the two institu­
tions or their underlying problems are more distinct than expected.
Intentionally Triggered Cognitive Interaction: Request f o r  Assistance
Cognitive Interaction may also take the form  o f  an in tentional request by one 
institution for the assistance o f  another institu tion. T h e  source institution
134
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can draw the attention o f  actors within the target institution to a particular 
aspect o f which they had so far not taken due account —  at least seen from 
the perspective o f the source institution. Accordingly, actors o f the target 
institution learn that an adaptation o f their institution could strengthen the 
effectiveness o f  the source institution. For example, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) requested assistance for the implementation and enforcement o f its 
trade restrictions from the World Customs Organization (W CO) which 
adapted its customs codes accordingly (Lanchbery, 2006). In cases o f a 
request for assistance, the source institution largely frames the learning 
process. Its secretariat will usually formally transfer a request to the secretariat 
of the target institution that will officially feed it into the decision-making 
process o f  the latter.
The prerequisites for a successful request for assistance are much more 
demanding than those for learning from a policy model. On the one hand, 
a successful request presupposes that the issue-areas governed by the institu­
tions involved overlap significantly. It would not be useful for CITES to 
request assistance from the W CO, i f  W CO policies did not matter for the 
implementation o f  CITES. On the other hand, the requested adaptation of 
policies must be beneficial, or at least neutral, for the target institution, 
because the members o f the target institution will usually not be inclined vol­
untarily to harm their institution. However, they may find it difficult to reject 
another institution’s request for assistance with indifferent effects. Thus, the 
WCO responded favourably to the request o f CITES to adapt its customs 
codes although it did  not directly benefit from doing so.
Whereas an inter-institutional request for assistance can be expected to 
produce synergistic or at least neutral effects for the target institution, it is 
intended to create a positive feedback effect on the source institution. 
C ITES requested the World Customs Organization to adapt, because it 
expected this change to facilitate the enforcement o f its own policy. Hence, 
requests for assistance enable an institution to draw on other institutions 
in order to enhance its own effectiveness, even if it cannot force the target 
institution to adapt its rules.4
The Causal Mechanism of Interaction through Commitment
In this sectio n , vve first develop the general rationale o f  the causal m echanism  
o f  In teractio n  th rou gh  Commitment. Subsequently, we present three ideal 
types o f  this causal mechanism, nam ely institutional interaction that creates 
a dem and fo r ju risd ictional d elim itatio n , in teractio n  betw een nested 
institu tions, and institutional in teraction  activating an additional m eans o f  
governance.
135
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Rationale
Interaction through Commitment is based on the power o f international 
norms. Commitments entered into under one institution may induce actors 
to modify their preferences and negotiating behaviour regarding issues 
related to another institution. These modifications may in turn affect the 
decision-making process o f that institution. For example, the W TO commit­
ment not to discriminate against imported goods according to the methods 
by which they have been produced renders it difficult for W TO  members to 
adopt trade sanctions within international environmental regimes or within 
the International Labour Organization (ILO ) to reinforce the effectiveness 
o f  these institutions (Brack, 2002).
In line with theories o f international institutions, the causal mechanism pre­
supposes that international obligations create at least some binding force. 
Actors behaving according to the constructivist ‘logic o f appropriateness’ 
(March and Olsen, 1998) will generally follow valid norms, because such 
behaviour is legitimate and reduces the costs o f  instrumental decision­
making. Actors behaving according to the rationalist ‘logic o f  consequences’ 
will also frequendy adhere to valid norms. Often institutional obligations cannot 
be violated without jeopardizing underlying cooperation projects. Actors 
might also endeavour to preserve a reputation o f keeping their promises 
because possible future cooperators would otherwise be less inclined to 
enter into agreements with them (Keohane, 1984: 105 -6 ). I f  commitments 
entered into within one institution are costly, actors will gain an additional 
interest in subjecting the members o f  other institutions to similar obligations.
Interaction through Commitment evolves in the following steps. First, 
members o f the source institution agree upon an obligation that might be 
relevant for the target institution. Second, this obligation actually commits 
one or more states that are members o f both institutions. Third, the com­
mitment induces some o f these states to modify their preferences and negoti­
ating behaviour related to the target institution. Fourth, these modifications 
influence the collective decision-making process o f  the target institution and 
its output.
Interaction through C om m itm ent requires som e overlap o f  both  the
memberships and the issue-areas of the interacting institutions. Without
overlapping memberships, the target institution would remain unaffected
because none o f its members would be subject to relevant c o m m itm e n ts
under th e  source institution. W ith o u t  overlapping issue-areas, c o m m itm e n ts
could n o t m odify the preferences o f  states regarding issues related  to  the tar­
get institution.
Interaction  through C om m itm en t occurs in three d istinct types, which 
differ profoundly regarding their inherent rationales as well as regarding
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their specific preconditions and expected effects. Whereas some overlap of 
memberships and issues o f interacting institutions is necessary to generate 
Interaction through Commitment, we would not expect institutions to exert 
significant influence on each other’s normative development if they were 
identical in all important respects. Accordingly, interacting institutions must 
differ in some important dimension to create momentum for interaction. 
Meaningful interaction effects can be expected if otherwise overlapping insti 
tutions differ in respect o f  their memberships, or o f their objectives, or of 
their governance instruments, because these three properties determine the 
who, why and how o f  international governance projects. The three types of 
Interaction through Commitment developed in the following vary with 
respect to exactly one o f  these three dimensions.
Interaction through Com m itm ent Based upon D ifferent Objectives: 
Jurisdictional D elim itation
Demand for the delimitation o f jurisdictions will arise if  two institutions with 
similar memberships, but different objectives, address the same set o f issues. 
Under these circumstances, actors may adapt the policies, norms and obliga­
tions o f one o f these institutions in light o f the existence o f the other. For 
example, the obligations o f the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity conferring rights of control to states 
importing genetically modified organisms (GM Os) were significantly 
adapted to the broader commitments under the W’l O Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) (Oberthiir and Gehring, 2006b).
Institutions with different objectives may diverge in their appraisal o f par­
ticular policies. Every international institution disposes o f its own criteria to 
assess policy measures and the related behaviour o f states and non-state 
actors (Gehring, 1994: 4 3 3 -4 9 ) . As a result, different institutions may 
appraise a policy measure differently. Environmentally motivated trade 
restrictions will be considered as undesired interference with international 
trade from the perspective o f the W TO, which aims at liberalizing inter 
national trade and seeks to abolish trade obstacles. The same measures are 
appreciated as effective means for enforcing international environmental 
standards from the perspective o f international environmental regimes, 
which are frequently established to protect common pool resources or col­
lective goods.
In jurisdictional delimitation cases, the members o f the institutions 
involved are in a ‘mixed motive’ situation that resembles the game-theoretic 
constellation o f  the Battle o f  the Sexes (Stein, 1982; Keohane, 1984). On 
the one hand, both sides possess a general interest in some sort o f separation 
of jurisdictions in order to avoid fruitless regulatory competition and a
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reduced effectiveness o f their respective institutions. Neither side will be 
served if the institutions involved interfere with each other. On the other 
hand, the constituencies o f the institutions will have conflicting preferences 
regarding the appropriate solution. In the conflict between trade and envi­
ronment, actors prioritizing liberal international trade will advocate regula­
tion by the W TO, while countries struggling for environmental protection 
may prefer the jurisdiction o f the environmental regimes involved.
Commitments o f the earlier institution will almost automatically limit the 
room for manoeuvre within the later institution, because they strengthen 
actors advocating the objectives o f the earlier institution. Like the game- 
theoretic Battle o f the Sexes situation, the ideal type o f  Jurisdictional 
Delimitation does not possess a single equilibrium. However, an equilibrium 
found in a Battle o f the Sexes situation will be fairly stable, because neither 
side can expect to gain from resumption o f conflict. This implies that the 
earlier institution will possess a ‘first-mover advantage’ (Héritier, 1996; Mattli, 
2003). In the trade and environment debate, the older GATT/W TO has 
been viewed as ‘chilling’ the negotiations on environmental regimes because 
negotiators have frequently shied away from even discussing measures that 
might be in conflict with GATT/WTO rules (Palmer et al., 2006: 186; 
Eckersley, 2004). In this case, the first-mover advantage o f  the W TO has 
limited the range o f options available to negotiators within environmental 
regimes.
The challenge o f an established distribution o f jurisdictions may lead to 
open conflict among the institutions involved. The jurisdiction o f an institu­
tion can be challenged by agreeing on incompatible commitments within 
another institution. Creation o f such ‘strategic inconsistency’ (Raustiala and 
Victor, 2004: 301) will be particularly relevant if new regulatory objectives 
such as environmental protection are to be promoted in a field already gov" 
erned by an existing institution with differing objectives. Thus, in te r n a tio n a l 
environmental regimes established since the 1970s have almost automatically 
encroached upon the jurisdiction o f  the established international trade 
regime whenever they have restricted trade for environmental p u rp o ses. 
Hence, environmental regimes have gradually pushed back the jurisdiction
of the WTO and partially reversed the latter’s ‘chill effect’ (Oberthür and 
Gehring, 2006b).
Jurisdictional delimitation cases will virtually always create disruptive 
effects on the target institution. Because o f their diverging objectives, the 
institutions involved pull in different directions. The source institution 
encroac es upon the jurisdiction o f the target institution. As a result, the 
e ectiveness o f the target institution will almost inevitably be undermined, 
n amicable delimitation o f issue-areas may only be expected if  one insti- 
ution clearly dominates. Accordingly, the ideal type o f jurisdictional
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delimitation poses the governance challenge to arrive at a delimitation of 
jurisdictions that honours the basic objectives o f both institutions and is least 
detrimental for their operation.
Interaction through Com m itm ent Based upon D ifferent Memberships: Nested 
Institutions
Interaction between nested institutions constitutes a mechanism for policy 
diffusion that gains its momentum from the tension between institutions 
with a smaller (regional) and a larger (global) membership. It is driven by the 
different memberships o f  two international institutions that ideally pursue 
identical objectives and employ the same governance instruments. If  the 
membership o f  one institution forms part o f the membership o f another 
institution, two formally independent institutions with similar objectives and 
regulatory means are ‘nested’ into each other (Aggarwal, 1998; Young, 
1996). For example, the Schengen regime on the abolition of controls at 
internal borders among the member states and on compensating measures 
heavily influenced the development o f corollary policies within the European 
Union (Gehring, 1998).
The ideal type o f interaction between nested institutions rests on the fol­
lowing factors. First, negotiation analysis demonstrates that institutions with 
divergent memberships may arrive at differing obligations, even if  addressing 
identical problems (Sebenius, 1983). It is typically easier to reach agreement 
within a smaller (e.g. regional) than in a larger (e.g. global) institution 
because a higher number o f participants usually implies a greater hetero­
geneity of interests (Snidal, 1994). Hence, the originally few Schengen states 
could agree on the abolition o f  border controls and compensating measures, 
while similar agreement proved initially impossible within the broader EU 
membership.5 Second, commitments agreed upon within the source institu­
tion streamline the preferences o f  its members. As a result, the members 
develop a common interest in expanding obligations to other countries be 
it to commit competitors to costly obligations, to preclude free-riding, or to 
reinforce the effectiveness o f their agreement.6 Third, based upon their 
common commitment, members of the smaller institution form a natural 
coalition during negotiations within the larger institution. Hence, the prob 
ability increases that the coordinated position o f the coalition constitutes 
some ‘focal point’ (Schelling, I9 6 0 : 100) around which expectations con­
verge.
Interaction between nested institutions presupposes that two (or more ) 
institutions with similar objectives but different memberships govern signifi 
cantly overlapping issue-areas, and that the political dynamics of agreeing 
new obligations differs significantly. Evidently, the presence o f these factors
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does not ensure that interaction occurs, because adverse constellations of 
interests prevailing within the larger institution may effectively preclude 
adoption o f a policy measure agreed upon in the smaller setting. They con­
stitute merely necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the emergence 
o f this type o f interaction.
The rationale o f  interaction between nested institutions suggests that its 
effects will largely support the effectiveness o f  the target institution. Similar 
or identical objectives o f  the institutions generate compatible priorities and 
ren er disruptive effects  highly improbable, if  not impossible. Accordingly, 
t is type o f interaction provides a mechanism for policy diffusion within the 
same policy field and offers opportunities for forum shopping. Actors striv­
ing or regulation o f a particular issue may choose whether to promote their 
proposa s predominantly in the smaller or in the larger institution — with a 
view to using the smaller institution strategically to promote policy diffusion.
Interaction through Commitment based upon A vailability  o f  D ifferent
Governance Instruments: A dditional Means
The transfer o f a commitment from one institution to another one pursuing 
e same o jective with identical membership may be significant for inter- 
«  /ki ®ovc*71ance ^ activates an additional governance instrument (means) 
r, a* a . C r° C, targct institution. The interaction between the regime for the 
Sea c  ICpn °  1 C ^ ort  ^ ^ast Atlantic (OSPAR) and the International North 
establislle£l in the 1980s may serve as an illustration. While 
took S a r "  <!eCl^ ti!0nS, that Were formal,y non-binding, the Conferences 
Dolitirallv6 3 a p°  cal level and generated political pressure. Having 
became f ° n. * °  P^ase‘out o f certain substances and activities, it
identical nh|CU ■ ° F 1 e ,niem^cr states to resist the adoption o f  substantively
OSPAR-ConvLtioLW SinncehO S M W° ik institution’ ^orieinallv cr.fr w  '.  O S I A R  relies on  hard in ternational law, the
“ » O S  8““ 0 " 5 " Cre tranSf" ted iM°  legal,y b W in g  hard 'aW
main conditions lntC[‘lcr'on activating an additional means rests on two
3 , X a S , h e  C° mmi" ed “  “  - > hi"  ' " sti,U,i0"
t iv X  e a »  k i a  , '  commitment to another institution. This will be compara­
dle source institution '  i T  prevlolls agreement on the same obligation within 
does not chanee the ° Wever’ such simPle diffusion o f an obligation alone 
institutions. Therefo^ Uatl0n Slgn^Icanr,y for actors that are members o f  both
mobilize an addition^gcZ T n Z T eZ s^ ' ^  tian*fcrred obliSation also haS t°  
to implement the nhr -• ! instrument that provides a new incentive
different governance in rT ^  et,uent)>'’ international institutions control 
governance instruments. While some institutions rely almost exclusively
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on ‘soft’ law, others resort to legally binding ( ‘hard’ ) international law 
(Abbott and Snidal, 2000). The European Union even controls supranational 
law that is subject to a particularly stringent supervisory apparatus (Alter, 
2000). Some institutions dispose o f financial assistance mechanisms (Keohane 
and Levy, 1996), non-compliance procedures (Victor et al., 1998), particular 
enforcement measures, etc. while others do not.
Interaction o f  the additional means type will regularly raise the effective­
ness o f  both institutions involved. I f  the diffusion o f an obligation activates 
an additional governance instrument, it will support the effectiveness of the 
target institution. At the same time, activating an additional means automat­
ically contributes to a more effective implementation o f the source institu­
tion. In the aforementioned example, the more effective implementation of 
hard-law OSPAR obligations to protect the Northeast Atlantic automatically 
helped achieve the goals o f the North Sea Conferences.7 Because o f its 
synergistic effects on both the source and the target institution, interaction 
activating additional means allows actors operating within the source institu­
tion to enhance the effectiveness o f international governance and provides 
opportunities for choosing in which o f the institutions available to launch a 
particular regulatory initiative (forum shopping).
The Causal Mechanism of Behavioural Interaction
Behavioural Interaction is based on the interdependence o f behaviour across 
the domains o f  institutions. The source institution triggers behavioural 
changes that affect implementation in the target institution. This causal 
mechanism is located at the outcome level and influences the performance of 
the target institution within its own domain. All international governance 
institutions are designed to influence the behaviour o f relevant actors in 
order to achieve their objectives (Levy et al., 1995; Young, 1992). In some 
cases, behavioural changes occurring within the domain o f one institution 
exert influence on the domain o f another institution. If states and private 
actors plant fast-growing trees in response to the Kyoto Protocol’s incentive 
for carbon sequestration in forests, they might automatically encroach upon 
biodiversity, which is protected under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (C BD ) (Jacquemont and Caparrôs, 2002), and thereby undermine
the effectiveness o f the CBD.
Behavioural Interaction evolves in the following steps. First, the source 
institution must produce an output, for example a set o f prescriptions or pro­
scriptions. Second, relevant states or non-state actors have to adapt their 
behaviour in response to the output. Third, the behavioural changes trig­
gered by the source institution must be relevant for the target institution. 
Behavioural changes may be relevant for both  issue-areas, or they may
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prompt further behavioural changes within the domain o f the target institu­
tion. Fourth, this behavioural effect has to be relevant for the effectiveness 
o f the target institution.
Behavioural Interaction has two important prerequisites. First, it requires 
that the source institution actually exerts influence on the behaviour of rele­
vant states (e.g. implementing legal obligations) and/or on the behaviour of 
non-state actors (e.g. adjusting to domestic implementation legislation). 
Second, the issue-areas governed by the institutions involved must be close 
enough to matter for each other. Behavioural Interaction cannot be expected 
to occur if the issue-areas do not significantly overlap or are functionally 
unrelated to each other. Under these circumstances, behaviour triggered by 
one institution would hardly become relevant for another institution. In con­
trast, Behavioural Interaction does not depend on a collective decision 
within the target institution, because it occurs exclusively within the two 
issue-areas involved. Unlike Cognitive Interaction and Interaction through 
Commitment, Behavioural Interaction might even come about unnoticed by 
the actors operating within the target institution.
Whereas the general causal mechanism o f  Behavioural Interaction does 
not indicate whether its effects are beneficial (synergistic) or adverse (dis­
ruptive) for the target institution, the rationales o f three specific ideal types 
reveal clear-cut hypotheses on the quality o f effects. The types vary as to 
whether the institutions involved differ in respect o f  their objectives, or their 
memberships, or their governance instruments.
If Behavioural Interaction is driven by different objectives o f the involved 
institutions, it will result in disruption o f the target institution. In this case, 
the same group o f actors ideally addresses the same issue within two institu­
tions that pursue different objectives. As a result, behavioural changes of 
states and non-state actors triggered by the source institution may easily be 
at odds with the objectives o f the target institution and may thus undermine 
the latter s performance. It is difficult to think o f a situation in which they 
could systematically reinforce the effectiveness o f  the target institution. 
Behavioural Interaction driven by different objectives is closely related to 
jurisdictional delimitation cases located at the output level. Indeed, cases of 
both types appear frequently in concert. For example, the conflict between 
the W TO and international environmental institutions with trade restrictions 
is not limited to the rules made at the output level. It extends to the imple­
mentation of these rules at the o u t c o m e  level. Whenever a m e m b e r  state 
imp ements a trade restriction enacted under an environmental regime, it will 
implicitly undermine the effectiveness o f the W TO rules on free trade.
Behavioural Interaction relies upon different memberships o f  the insti­
tutions involved, it will always create synergy. In this case, different groups 
o actors, 1 eally, address the same issue, employing identical means of
142
Gehring and Oberthür: The Causal Mechanisms o f Interaction
governance within two institutions that pursue like objectives. Due to the 
matching objectives, behavioural changes triggered by one institution will 
automatically be in conformity with the policy direction o f the other. This 
type o f Behavioural Interaction constitutes the corollary o f interaction 
between nested institutions at the output level. Compared with the latter, 
however, the direction o f influence is reversed: only the larger (global) insti 
tution can trigger behavioural effects beyond those already triggered by the 
smaller (regional) institution. Again, cases located at the output level may be 
linked to cases located at the outcome level. While the regional Bamako 
Convention on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes con 
tributed to a rule change o f the global Basel Convention, the latter helped 
implement the Bamako Convention, because it restricted the exports o f such 
wastes from industrialized countries to non-OECD countries (Clapp, 1994).
If Behavioural Interaction is driven by different means o f governance avail­
able to the institutions involved, it will also virtually always create synergy. In 
this case, the same group o f actors ideally addresses the same issue within two 
institutions that pursue the same objectives, but dispose of different means 
of governance. Due to matching objectives, behavioural changes triggered 
by one institution will once again almost automatically serve the ends o f the 
other institution. Thus, this type o f  Behavioural Interaction constitutes the 
corollary to the additional means type located at the output level and may 
follow from a case o f  that type. Requests for assistance frequently trigger a 
similar causal chain. As mentioned above, the action taken by the World 
Customs Organization (W CO) in response to the request for assistance from 
CITES in turn supported the implementation o f CITES.
The Causal Mechanism of Impact-Level Interaction
Impact-level Interaction rests on the interdependence of the ultimate gov­
ernance targets o f the institutions involved. In this case, the ultimate go­
vernance target o f one institution, such as international trade or the ozone layer, 
is directly influenced by side-effects originating from the ultimate governance 
target o f  another institution. In this way, Impact-level Interaction exerts influ­
ence 0 1 1  the effectiveness o f the target institution. A stylized example that we 
owe to Arild Underdal illustrates this causal mechanism. Consider that pro­
tection o f the stocks o f  cod and herring are the ultimate targets of two sep­
arate international institutions. As cod eats herring, successful protection of 
cod, resulting in a growing population o f this species, will automatically 
decrease the population o f herring. Further examples o f Impact-level 
Interaction include the interdependence between increased global welfare 
(the ultimate governance target o f the W TO) and the stabilization o f the 
world climate (the ultimate governance target o f the global climate regime),
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or between the world climate and the preservation o f biodiversity (the ultim­
ate target o f the Convention on Biological Diversity), Even a fully effective 
International Agreement on the Conservation o f Polar Bears and their 
Habitat might not succeed in protecting the polar bears if the climate change 
regime does not succeed in stabilizing the global climate, because the bears’ 
habitats are immediately dependent on the state of the global climate.
This causal mechanism does not depend on any action within the target 
institution or its domain, but rests on the ‘functional linkage’ (Young, 2002: 
23; 8 3 -1 0 9 ) o f the ultimate governance targets o f the institutions involved. 
In contrast to Behavioural Interaction, inter-institutional influence does not 
rely on changed behaviour o f relevant actors within the domain o f the target 
institution (see Figure 2). Instead, it relies upon the functional link between 
the ultimate governance targets o f the two institutions involved. In the 
above-mentioned example, it is increased population o f  cod, not human 
behaviour, that leads directly to a decreasing population o f herring.
Impact-level Interaction evolves in the following steps. First, the source 
institution produces an output. Second, states and non-state actors operating 
within the issue-area governed by this institution adapt their behaviour in 
response. Third, these behavioural changes affect the ultimate governance tar­
get of the source institution. Fourth, this impact exerts influence on the ultim­
ate governance target, and thus on the effectiveness o f the target institution.
The functional linkage o f the ultimate governance targets o f international 
institutions can be stable, but it may also change in the longer term. In many 
cases, Impact-level Interaction relies on stable interdependencies o f the bio­
physical environment, such as the interconnectedness o f the populations of 
cod and herring. In other cases, however, functional interdependencies are 
themselves subject to possible long-term change. For example, increased inter­
national trade and economic growth promoted by the W TO currently lead to 
increased emissions o f greenhouse gases, and thus undermine the effectiveness 
of the global climate regime. However, this functional interdependence might 
one day be overcome by technical progress or changes in production methods.
The rationale o f this causal mechanism does not support any hypothesis as 
to the systematic quality o f  effects. The effects o f  Impact-level Interaction on 
t ie  target institution may be synergistic, or disruptive, or indeterminate. 
Moreover, we cannot yet suggest any meaningful ideal types o f  cases driven 
y this causal mechanism that would systematically create specific effects.
Mutual Exclusiveness and Generalizability of Causal Mechanisms
and Types
A limited number o f completely different causal mechanisms and more spe- 
ea types rive interaction among international institutions. They all
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have their inherent rationales, conditions for their occurrence, and expected 
effects, as reflected in Table 1. However, considering the multitude o f inter­
national institutions and the many incidents o f interaction among them, the 
number o f distinct rationales by which inter-institutional influence can be 
driven is comparatively limited.
The general causal mechanisms presented in the preceding sections con­
stitute deductively derived and mutually exclusive models. Such models are 
not intended to provide precise descriptions o f all properties o f relevant 
interaction cases. They highlight the relevant components o f the different 
causal pathways o f  interaction. Hence, they may, or may not, fit a given case. 
Mixed cases are unlikely because the mechanisms are located at three differ­
ent levels o f  effectiveness, and they involve different actors. A case o f inter­
action cannot be driven by Behavioural Interaction and Interaction through 
Commitment or Impact-level Interaction at the same time.8 In rare cases, it 
might be difficult to distinguish empirically whether members o f the target 
institution learn from the source institution (Cognitive Interaction) or adapt 
their preferences according to the commitments entered into under the 
source institution (Interaction through Commitment).
The four causal mechanisms are likely to cover the full range o f causal 
mechanisms relevant for interaction among international institutions. 1 he 
decision-making process o f  an institution may hardly be systematically influ­
enced other than by knowledge (Cognitive Interaction) and obligations gen­
erated by another institution (Interaction through Commitment). Likewise, 
interaction directly influencing the behavioural performance o f the target 
institution will always originate from the behavioural effects o f the source 
institution. It seems to be rather unlikely, for example, that the international 
ozone regime would pass international trade rules that are unrelated to the 
protection o f  the ozone layer and directly influence behaviour related to 
world trade. Nothing o f that kind has been reported in the literature so far. 
It is also difficult to see how effects at the impact level within one institution 
(e.g. increased global welfare) might directly affect the behaviour o f actors 
governed by another institution (e.g. C 0 2 emissions by industry) or that 
institution’s decision-making process (international climate policies) without 
first affecting the ultimate target o f governance of the target institution 
(world climate).
The id ea l types o f  institutional interaction also rely 0 1 1  their own, mutually 
exclusive rationales. They are theoretically constructed and elucidate a par­
ticular set o f  important characteristics o f cases that are related to their under­
lying rationales. Like the general causal mechanisms, they have explanatory 
power (Weber, 1904: 1 9 0 -2 1 2 ; Hedstrôm and Swedberg, 1998: 13-15). 
Since the ideal types o f interaction presented above have been developed 
against the backdrop o f  a limited sample o f  somewhat more than 150 cases
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Table 1
Overview o f  Causal Mechanisms and Ideal Types
Causal Key Ideal Basic Key Characteristics/ Probable
Mechanism Trigger Type Rationale Conditions Effect
Provision of Policy Model Target institution • Unintentionally triggered Synergistic
C o g n it iv e information or adapts to a policy • Similarity of problems
I n t e r a c t io n ideas model addressed
Request for Target institution • Intentionally triggered Neutral or
Assistance adapts upon request • Overlap of governance areas synergistic
s for assistancet-U
s Jurisdictional Competition for • Difference of objectives
0 Delimitation regulatory authority • Overlap of governance areas 
and memberships
Disruptive
I n t e r a c t io n Commitment of Nested Vertical policy • Difference of memberships
T h r o u g h member states Institutions diffusion from • Overlap of governance Synergistic
C o m m it m e n t smaller to larger 
institution
areas and memberships
Additional Horizontal policy • Difference of governance Synergistic
Means diffusion activating 
additional governance 
instrument
instruments 
• Overlap of governance 
areas and memberships
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‘Table 1 (Continued)
Causal Key Ideal Basic Key Characteristics/ Probable
Mechanism Trigger Type Rationale Conditions Effect
Corollary to Conflicting or • Difference of objectives Disruptive
Jurisdictional competing obligations • Overlap of governance areas
Delimitation
<ue B e h a v io u r a l Adjustment Corollary to Vertical implementation • Difference of memberships Synergisticc0 I n t e r a c t io n of behaviour by Nested assistance from larger • Overlap of governance
3 states and Institutions to smaller institution areas
o non-stateactors Corollary to Reinforcement of • Difference of
Additional implementtion through governance instruments Synergistic
Means additional governance 
instrument
• Overlap of governance 
areas
I m p a c t -l e v e l Influence Ultimate governance
t5rt I n t e r a c t io n on ultimate - target of one institution • Functional interdependence SynergisticC**
E governance target influences ultimate of ultimate governance or neutral or
...........
governance target of 
another institution
targets disruptive
Gehring 
and 
O
berthür: The 
Causal M
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s of 
Interaction
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(Gehring and Oberthür, 2006), we cannot exclude that more ideal types 
with yet other rationales exist. Moreover, in the real world, mixed cases 
driven by two ideal types related to the same causal mechanism may occur. 
Two interacting institutions may, for example, differ simultaneously in 
regard to their memberships and their means o f governance. However, the 
occurrence of mixed cases does not conceptually devaluate the usefulness 
and mutual exclusiveness o f the ideal types that have not been developed to 
exhaust the possible variance o f  real-world cases, but to reduce complexity 
and point to particularly relevant aspects o f cases.
Both the causal mechanisms and the ideal types presented in this article are 
generally applicable to the study o f institutional interaction in international 
governance. While they have been developed against the backdrop o f a sam­
ple of cases from environmental governance, and most o f  our illustrative 
examples are from that governance area, they reflect general rationales 
erive rom theories o f international cooperation and international rela­
tions. ey can be employed to analyse cases o f institutional interaction from 
other samples and policy fields, such as the interaction between: NATO and 
the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy (Whitman, 2004); dif­
ferent human rights regimes (Heifer, 2000 ; T isto u n et, 2 0 0 0 ); the WTO, the 
uropean ingle Market policy and the Lomé Treaty culminating in the 
banana dispute’ (Alter and Meunier, 2006); the W TO and the ILO  (Compa 
and Diamond, 1996; Moorman, 2001); and many others.
Towards the Analysis of More Complex Interaction Situations
pYnInrp^r° aC^  developed in this article can be employed systematically to 
Fventi ,I|n0re comP ex interaction settings and their emergent properties. 
intern,-'1 ^  Want to cxamine complexes composed o f  several cases of 
new r>ro°n V  ma  ^‘n^uence each other in unexpected ways, so that
in d iv id u^  1CS °  overal1 situation emerge which are not inherent in its 
reveal th COmponents' T ^e analysis o f individual interaction cases does not 
plants cannnfPI ° PertuS’ mUCh *lke an examinati°n  o f  individual trees and 
erties o f rh,- f  P cmcr8cnr properties o f  a forest. However, the prop- 
trees and nlantT^ ! ° m the Particu,ar forms o f  coexistence o f the
and develnnm ’ ng their mutual influence on each other’s existence
"  SyS,CmitiC nation o f « « »  allows for
interaction s i tu a i  ° ï  Pattems and emergent effects o f  more complex 
posing approach C ’ W / e,retaming the analytical advantages o f the decom-
c l u ! ,m  are w o  p n n d p al p a ,ttrn s  o f  
chain s. I^ su ch  coretd lad ons o n e " d ‘ ' ï " " ' “ " 1'  50 that th e >' formns, one case o f interaction gives rise to a subsequent
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case that feeds back on the original source institution or influences a third 
institution. Such follow-on cases are inherent in the rationale o f several ideal 
types o f interaction. A request for assistance is issued in order to reinforce the 
effectiveness o f  the original source institution through a behavioural feedback 
effect (Behavioural Interaction). The synergistic feedback effects that an add- 
itional-means case regularly has on the source institution occur at the outcome 
level (Behavioural Interaction). The target institution of a case o f the 
jurisdictional-delimitation type may respond with its own jurisdictional activity, 
thus triggering a reverse case of jurisdictional delimitation. For example, the 
WTO, especially through its Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement), constrained the use of trade measures related to genetically 
modified organisms under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Negotiations 
on the Cartagena Protocol, in turn, precluded the development of further 
rules on the appropriate risk assessment for genetically modified organisms 
within the W TO  (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006b).
Cases o f interaction may also ‘cluster’ around certain issues and institu­
tions. While causal chains address causation between sequential cases of 
interaction, clusters address settings o f parallel cases o f interaction without 
requiring causation between cases. In this case, several institutions concur 
rently address a particular issue in complementary or competitive w'ays. 
Accordingly, we may expect to find competitive interaction clusters (e.g. 
interaction between the W TO and several environmental regimes). We may 
also find cooperative clusters, in which particular forms o f inter-institutional 
division o f labour and coordination develop. For example, C U E S  has grad­
ually become the centre o f  a cluster o f institutions in the area o f wildlife pro­
tection, indicating the emergence o f a more centralized arrangement for 
inter-institutional management (Lanchbery, 2006). The International North 
Sea Conferences have even been established not least to provide for a 
co-ordinating mechanism, and to set priorities, for future activities in various 
institutions relevant for the protection o f the North Sea (Skjærseth, 2006).
Causal chains and clusters are two typical patterns of interlocking struc­
tures o f international governance institutions emerging from institutional 
interaction. While these interlocking structures (Underdal and Young, 2004. 
374 -5 ) reflect the normative expectations of international society, they also 
define the division o f labour among the institutions involved in a given prob­
lem area o f international relations. Interlocking governance structures evolve 
in ways that are distinct from the evolution o f the sector-specific institutions 
of which they are composed (Raustiala and Victor, 2004: 279). So far, they 
have hardly been ‘rationally designed’ (Koremenos et al., 2001) not least 
because o f the lack o f an overarching institution capable o f  managing 
institutional interaction within the international system. Shedding light on 
how efforts to enhance international governance may affect each other across
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different issue-areas, the conceptual fram ew ork presented  in  this article helps 
understand the origins o f  em ergent in terlock ing  governance structures and 
provides a basis for their further system atic study.
Conclusion
The conceptual framework o f institutional interaction developed in this art­
icle elucidates how an international institution can influence the normative 
development and the performance o f another international institution. In 
contrast to other approaches that seek to describe and classify complex inter­
action situations as a whole (Young, 1996, 2 0 0 2 ), it focuses on the causal 
relationship between the institutions involved. While actor-centred 
approaches attribute interaction to forum shopping activities o f relevant 
actors (Raustiala and Victor, 2004), it points to the institutionally created 
opportunities or and restrictions on forum shopping and demonstrates how 
actors transmit influence from one institution to another. It also captures 
numerous instances o f institutional interaction that are not intentionally trig­
gered and thus reaches well beyond intentional forum shopping.
e conceptual framework helps structure the multifaceted realm o f inter 
etW<;en 'nternat>onal institutions, and provides systematic insights 
strata T "  |UUi,nS 8overnance within the international system. It demon- 
, S 3t r, e ro area ° f  institutional interaction comprises different 
n rfr^ mena 1 31 must be careflilly distinguished and analysed to grasp their 
merha Consetj uences ° r effective international governance. The four causal 
to anni-hSmS C j 1C'i ate, ° W 'n^uencc can generally travel from one institution 
erenri»« a n Ju  J  ^  mV attention to the varying roles o f actors, their pref 
action rrflrrt ° aV1° l!r 111 this process. The more specific ideal types o f inter- 
a causal mp ,partlcu ^  characteristics o f different subsets o f  cases following 
conditions fn ^  ^ S°  provide a ^ sis for exploring the necessary
* « n  * d r  SUbS,antiV'
i a  “ Z „ e d  ? , h UPOn thdr, ^Their analytical nr, • cmPiricaI complexity o f real-world situations.
fo m  ,hdr abl1^  “  “  ,hC 
set o f  models hiehliahf- ^  °  intcract'on- They provide the analyst with a 
institutions that facilitate f,°SSlble causal rdationships between international 
tutional interaction These C CXp, f ation o f real-world situations o f  insti­
g a t io n s , much like rhl ., , SUpport the analysis o f  interaction
■1 modcls hdp aMly*institu tions.
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The causal mechanisms and ideal types also provide the basis for a more 
encompassing theory o f institutional interaction. The distinct rationales of 
the theoretically derived models o f institutional interaction not only explicate 
the causal pathways o f institutional interaction, they also help identify the 
necessary conditions that need to be fulfilled for interaction to occur. In 
addition, they support the systematic development o f hypotheses concerning 
the quality o f  interaction effects. They demonstrate that different types o f 
interaction lead systematically either to synergistic or to disruptive effects. 
Nevertheless, theory development is just starting and we do not claim to 
have submitted a full-fledged theory o f institutional interaction.
Finally, the causal mechanisms and ideal types help explore more complex 
interaction situations and the interlocking structures o f international gov­
ernance institutions. In order to assess the causal relationships between the 
institutions involved, complex interaction situations must be analytically 
decomposed into individual cases with unidirectional causal pathways, fol­
lowing a particular causal mechanism and ideal type. These cases may subse­
quently be recombined to causal chains and clusters in order to grasp complex 
interaction situations and start exploring their emergent properties. On this 
basis, we may gain a conceptually founded idea o f  the interlocking structures 
of international governance institutions that emerge from complex interac­
tion situations and shape the normative expectations o f international society.
Notes
1 This article has grown out of the European research project ‘Institutional 
Interaction — How to Prevent Conflicts and Enhance Synergies between 
International and EU Environmental Institutions’, supported by the European 
Community under its Fifth Framework Programme for Research. We are grateful 
to the members of the research team for many fruitful discussions. We also thank 
Oran R. Young, Eva Gross, Rhiannon Williams and two anonymous reviewers for 
many useful comments.
2 While established research on the effectiveness of international institutions has also 
used an institution’s prime objective as the major yardstick for assessing its conse­
quences (e.g. Young, 1999; Haas et al., 1993), the causes and the effects of insti­
tutional interaction are located in the domains of different institutions. 1 herefore, 
we take the prime objective of the target institution as the relevant yardstick.
3 The agent-structure problem discussed in International Relations (Wendt, 1987; 
Carlsnaes, 1992) refers to this issue.
4 The feedback effect constitutes a reverse case of interaction in which influence is 
transmitted through a different causal mechanism, namely Behavioural 
Interaction.
5 In some cases, greater homogeneity of interests may also follow from factors other 
than the size of the institution, such as more homogeneous economic develop­
ment. The rationale of this type of interaction does not exclude the possibility that
151
European Journal o f International Relations 15(1)
the memberships of the interacting institutions are equally large, if they overlap 
only partially.
6 Thus, meaningful influence can only originate from the smaller institution and affect 
the larger institution. A transfer o f  an obligation from the larger to the smaller insti­
tution would not be relevant for the effectiveness of governance, because it would 
not affect the situation of any single actor when making decisions as to behaviour.
7 The adoption of the obligation in the target institution can thus be expected to 
trigger a positive feedback effect on the source institution that follows a different 
causal mechanism, namely Behavioural Interaction.
8 However, separate cases of Behavioural Interaction, Interaction through 
Commitment and Impact-level Interaction may well occur concurrently or in par­
allel between the same institutions.
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